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Abstract 
The previous financial crisis caused the ending of an unusually long phase of recovery in the former USSR republics, 
thus increasing the relevance of developing effective measures, specifically, the countercyclical economic policy. 
Throughout 1991 to 2010, fourteen completed cycles were identified in countries of Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). At the beginning of June 2011, one economy was in recovery phase, five economies were in the growth 
phase and one economy was in the decline phase. The authors also analyzed the level of countercyclical monetary 
policy of central banks in major economies of the CIS. The necessity of a more active countercyclical monetary policy 
in these countries was identified. 
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Introduction¤
Macroeconomic policies, especially monetary policies 
aimed at smoothing cyclical fluctuations are critical for 
maintaining stable and sustained economic growth. 
Economists in developed countries constantly explore 
the impact of monetary policy on the phases of busi-
ness cycles. Increased interest in these studies occurs 
in periods of economic crisis (Mendoza and Terrones, 
2008; Raghuram and Zingales, 1998; Wynne and 
Balke, 1995). Development of the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 confirms the urgency of cycle 
regulation in both theoretical and in practical aspects. 
The main objectives of this study are: (1) recording 
business cycles in the former Soviet Union and 
studying business cycle parameters (amplitude, du-
ration and causes of recessions, the level of syn-
chronization); (2) analyzing central banks’ impact 
on the parameters of business cycles in the major 
economies of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus). 
With all the variations and refinements, there are 
three main theories that explain the causes of cyclic 
fluctuations: the first relates to the dynamics of in-
vestment cycles, the second  with the uneven nature 
of the innovation process, and the third  to fluctua-
tions in money supply. Given the above objectives of 
this work, taken as the basis of the monetarism theory, 
which was outlined back in 1963 in the classical work 
of Friedman and Schwartz and detailed in the context 
of the impact of money on business cycles (Milton and 
Schwartz, 1975). Theoretical interpretation of the cen-
tral banks’ impact on the business cycles’ phases is 
based on the monetarism theory as well. 
1. Characteristics of business cycles 
1.1. Study of parameters of business cycles in the 
largest CIS countries. Economists have mostly used 
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two standard methods of recording peaks and low 
points of business cycles in individual countries: statis-
tical procedures and methods for subjective evalua-
tion (Don and Pagan, 1999; Don and Pagan, 2006; 
IMF, 2008; Wynne and Balke, 1995). The statistical 
method is based on the use of real GDP data. The 
subjective method takes into account the dynamics 
of a large number of macroeconomic indicators 
(GDP, industrial production, trade, capital flows, 
consumption, unemployment). The latter method, for 
example, has been used by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research USA. Both methods are based on 
annual data from 1960 to 2009, showing four points of 
lower global economic activity: 1975, 1982, 1991 and 
2009 years (IMF, 2009). 
In the International Monetary Fund report (IMF, 
2009), quarterly real GDP data is used to determine 
the cyclical peaks and low points. This monetary 
policy is called the Bry-Boschan for quarterly data 
(Don and Pagan, 1999; Don and Pagan, 2006). Us-
ing Bry-Boschan, representatives of the IMF have 
studied business cycles in 21 countries with devel-
oped economies for the period from 1960 to 2009 
(IMF, 2009). 
Using the data presented in Table 1, we can deter-
mine the largest economies of the CIS: Russia 
(75.6% of total real GDP of the CIS), Ukraine (7.6%), 
Kazakhstan (6.3%), and Belarus (3.5%). The com-
bined data of these countries produce about 93% of the 
total GDP of the CIS. These countries are also the 
leaders in terms of the CIS foreign trade, industrial 
production and other indicators of economic develop-
ment. Thus, we investigate only the parameters of 
business cycles and measures of monetary policy of 
these countries. In addition, Table 2 defines the year 
in which the individual CIS countries finally resumed 
the economic downturn caused by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and reached the value of real GDP, ex-
ceeding the 1990 level. 
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To investigate the recurrence of economic processes 
in the CIS countries, we use similar approaches to IMF 
methods analyzed above. As the basic indicator of a 
business cycle the annual growth rate of real GDP 
between 1991 and 2010 was chosen. To clarify the 
turning points of cycles, information about real quar-
terly GDP were also used. Parameters of business 
cycles of the CIS countries are shown in Appendix A. 
It is assumed that each country’s recovery phase 
lasted until the excess of real GDP pre-crisis level of 
1990 (Table 1). After reaching this level, it can be 
considered that the national economy has passed the 
phase of recovery. To determine the amplitude 
phase of recovery, we calculated the percentage of 
real GDP growth compared with 1990 levels. For 
downturns caused by the financial crisis of 2008-
2009, the amplitude of the recovery phase, accord-
ing to the IMF approach, is defined as the percen-
tage of real GDP growth a year after the recession 
(real GDP growth for 2010). 
Table 1. CIS GDP in constant prices of 2005, billions U.S. dollars 
Country 
1990  2009  Growth rate 2009/1990 Excess over 1990 level 
GDP data % GDP data %  GDP data year 
Armenia 4,076 0.36% 5,793 0.51% 142% 4,304 2004 
Azerbaijan 11,961 1.07% 26,949 2.35% 225% 13,245 2005 
Belarus 23,782 2.13% 39,876 3.48% 168% 24,773 2003 
Georgia* 11,939 1.07% 7,743 0.68% 65% -  
Kazakhstan 50,230 4.50% 71,770 6.27% 143% 52,073 2004 
Kyrgyzstan 3,069 0.27% 3,055 0.27% 100% -  
Moldova 6,101 0.55% 3,252 0.28% 53% -  
Russian Federation 845,224 75.68% 865,354 75.61% 102% 889,616 2007 
Tajikistan 3,824 0.34% 2,962 0.26% 77% -  
Turkmenistan 8,609 0.77% 12,414 1.08% 144% 8,676 2005 
Ukraine 137,383 12.30% 86,480 7.56% 63% -  
Uzbekistan 10,664 0.95% 18,873 1.65% 177% 10,962 2001 
CIS Total 1,116,862 100.00% 1,144,521 100.00% 102%   
Notes: *Withdrew from the CIS in August 2009. 
Source: Own calculations and [15]. 
As shown in Appendix A, for the past 20 years the 
CIS countries experienced 14 completed cycles. As 
of 2010, six economies are in the recovery phase, five 
economies are in the growth phase and one economy 
is in the decline phase. The decline phase of the CIS 
countries on average lasted 12.2 quarters, while in the 
developed countries 3.4 times less time. The average 
duration of recovery phase of the CIS countries 
amounted to 19.7 quarters or 6 times the duration of 
this phase in economically developed countries. The 
recovery phase in the CIS countries on average 
lasted 15.9 quarters, whereas in developed countries 
21.8 quarters. 
The amplitude of recession in the CIS averaged 
26.3% of decline of real GDP, where as in developed 
economies, it was 2.7% decline. The amplitude re-
covery in CIS countries averaged 47.4%, which ex-
ceeded the corresponding rates in the developed 
countries by more than 10 times. Longer phases of 
recovery in CIS countries is caused by unprecedented 
duration and amplitude decline, which was caused by 
the collapse of the USSR. 
The financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 
resulted in the complete recovery of three phases of 
the business cycle and phase recovery of four cycles. 
Three episodes of recession, after a short recovery, 
were driven by the financial crisis of 1998. The re-
cession phase, which followed the collapse of the 
USSR and half of the 6 CIS countries ended after 
1995, while three other countries had their recession 
phase end the following year. Thus, the decline in the 
CIS countries was characterized by high synchronici-
ty of business cycles. Conclusions on the high-level 
synchronization of business cycles in the CIS coun-
tries are confirmed by the correlation coefficients of 
annual growth rates of GDP of the CIS countries for 
the period of 1991-2009. Coefficients of correlation 
between business cycles of Russia, Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan and Belarus are among the largest. 
Appendix A also provides the indicators of business 
cycles in the major economies of the CIS: Russia, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Findings of the 
cycles in the major economies of the CIS are con-
firmed by using the software adapted to the present 
data to the quarterly GDP in the CIS (Engel, 2011). 
Despite the high synchronization of the dynamics of 
business cycles in these countries, rates of variation 
confirm the presence of significant differences in dura-
tion and amplitude of phase cycles. The largest CIS 
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economies experienced a shorter phase of recovery 
than the average for the CIS, as well as, smaller ampli-
tude and fall of real GDP. These numbers are ex-
plained by larger inertia of major economies. 
Appendix B presents dynamics of real GDP in the 
major economies of the CIS. In Russia, the decline 
phase lasted from 1991 through the second quarter 
of 1997 and the recovery phase lasted for the third 
and fourth quarters of 1997 (Figure 1). The year of 
1998 and the first quarter of 1999 showed a 7 decline 
phase caused by the financial crisis of 1998, which 
ended with the announcement of government default. 
Starting with the second quarter of 1999, the recovery 
and growth phases were observed and lasted 36 and 3 
quarters, respectively. The fourth quarter of 2008 
showed a decline phase, which lasted 5 quarters, with 
the first quarter of 2010 to be the recovery phase. 
In Ukraine, the decline phase lasted from 1991 
through 1999, and then began the recovery phase, 
which lasted 37 quarters (Figure 2). It should be noted 
that Ukraine is the only country we identified among 
the major economies of the CIS that was not seen in 
the recovery phase because of the absolute data of 
GDP data compared with 1990. The recession phase 
lasted five quarters through the fourth quarter of 2009. 
Since the first quarter of 2010, Ukraine’s economy has 
passed the phase of recovery. 
In Kazakhstan, the decline phase lasted from 1991 
through 1995; the recovery phase lasted six quarters 
(Figure 3). It should be noted that certain periods in 
the years of 1996-1997 can be identified as “times 
of uncertainty”, when the quarterly dynamics of real 
GDP did not meet the criterion of minimum dura-
tion of phase cycles for the Bry-Boschan routine for 
quarterly data (Don and Pagan, 1999; Don and Pa-
gan, 2006). During the first half of 1998 and the 
second half of 1999 a decline phase was caused by 
the financial crisis of 1998. The third quarter of 
1999 showed a recovery phase and then growth that 
lasted 20 and 18 quarters, respectively. The first 
quarter of 2009 showed a decline phase, which 
lasted until the third quarter of 2009. From the 
fourth quarter of 2009, Kazakhstan’s economy has 
passed the phase of recovery. 
In Belarus, the decline phase lasted from 1991 
through 1995; the recovery phase lasted for the next 
eight years (Figure 4). Since 2004, the recovery 
phase began, which went down during the second 
and third quarters of 2009. After the third quarter of 
2009, the recovery and growth phases began. 
1.2. The relationship among phase cycles of coun-
tercyclical monetary policy. In order to analyze the 
impact of monetary policy on business cycles, no-
minal interest rates and real interest rate fluctuation 
according to the Taylor rule are used (IMF, 2009). 
For each recession phase the basic measure of the 
policy was presented by the change of the designat-
ed indicator between the peak and the low point 
cycle, which is a cumulative measure of the wea-
kening or strengthening of the policy for the entire 
time of decline. In order to achieve the indicators of 
monetary policy, its stimuli were calculated as the 
sum of deviations in each quarter phase of decline. 
Most empirical studies do make distinctions be-
tween different phases of business cycles (Ber-
nanke, 1995; Enrique and Terrones, 2008; Christina 
and Romer, 1989; Wynne and Balke, 1995). An 
exception is the work of Peersman and Smets where 
it is shown that monetary policy usually carries a 
significant impact during recessions rather than 
during booms. Therefore, given the above study and 
the monetarism theory, we assume that monetary 
policy should have countercyclical orientation as 
during the recession phase (expansionist) and on the 
peaks of the growth phase (restriction). 
It should be noted that during the recovery phase the 
monetary policy should have a procyclical nature 
that promotes economic growth. However, at the 
peak of the growth phase (when there is an “over-
heated economy” and the imbalances emerge) and 
in decline phase monetary policy should be mainly 
driven by countercyclical motives. 
Table 2 presents an assessment of appropriate use of 
monetary policy types by central banks in the largest 
CIS countries. For the assessment of the appropriate 
use of restrictive or expansionary monetary policy, 
we were guided by three basic rules. First, a com-
prehensive restrictive monetary policy should be 
performed only after the economic transition from 
the recovery phase to the growth is completed. Oth-
erwise, the premature restrictive measures may in-
hibit the increased business activity and slow down 
the economic recovery to pre-crisis level. 
Second, an active restrictive policy should be held for 
a limited period of time that coincides with the peak of 
business activity. We determined the peaks of business 
activity on the basis of calculating the variance of 
quarterly real GDP growth indicators of average real 
GDP growth for the entire period of the recovery and 
growth phase. Applying the above rules, the central 
banks should be taking measures of restrictive mone-
tary policy during the defined periods (Table 2). 
Third, during the decline phase, methods of expan-
sionary monetary policy should be employed. This 
argument applies primarily to the early phase of re-
cession, when comprehensive and decisive measures 
of expansionary monetary policy can reduce the am-
plitude and duration of the decline phase. 
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Table 2. Evaluation of appropriate use monetary policy types 
Period
Restrictive policy (peaks of the growth phase) Expansionary policy (decline phase)
Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Belarus
2004 
1 qtr   +/-
2 qtr   +/-
3 qtr   +/-
4 qtr   +/-
2005 
1 qtr   +/-
2 qtr   
3 qtr   +/-
4 qtr   +/- +
2006 
1 qtr   +
2 qtr   + +
3 qtr   +
4 qtr  +/- + +/-
2007 
1 qtr  +/- + +/-
2 qtr  +/- +/-
3 qtr +  +/-
4 qtr +  
2008 
1 qtr +  +
2 qtr   +
3 qtr   +
4 qtr   + +
2009 
1 qtr   + + +
2 qtr   + + + +
3 qtr   + + + +
4 qtr   + +
2010 
1 qtr   
2 qtr   
3 qtr   
4 qtr   
Notes: Sign «+» means that the appropriate policy should be applied, signs «+/-» mean that the appropriate policy should be applied partially. 
Source: Own estimation.
2. Impact of central banks on phases of  
business cycles 
2.1. Instruments of monetary policy. We will ex-
plore the impact of monetary policy on the phase of 
business cycles in the major economies of the CIS on 
the basis of retrospective analysis of the use of basic 
tools of monetary policy. Table 3 lists the main tools 
of monetarypolicy, along with the regulations. 
Table 3. The main instruments of monetary policy 
Group of instruments 
Country
Ukraine Russia Kazakhstan Belarus
Main instruments of monetary policy
Interest rate policy Interest rate policy Interet rates based on bank of Russia operations 
Interest rate refinancing and 
monetary policy rates 
Regulation of refinancing and 
other rates 
Required reserves Regulating the rates of required reserves 
Regulating the rates of re-
quired reserves 
Regulating the rates of minimum 
required reserves 
Regulating the rates of required 
reserves 
Currency exchange 
policy 
Gold and foreign currency 
reserves management Currency interventions Currency interventions - 
Liquidity regulation 
Commercial banks  
refinancing 
Credit organizations 
refinancing 
Loan grants, accounting of debt 
securities Liquidity grants instruments 
Open market operations with 
securitites Operations with securitites 
Selling and buying of government 
securitites Liquidity absorbtion intruments 
Bond issuance Bond issuance Bond issuance -
- Establishing money supply targets Attraction of bank deposits - 
Limits Regulation of export/import of capital Direct limits Direct limits of specific operation - 
Source: [4, 13, 25, 29].
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Analyzing the contents of Table 3 we can conclude 
that the central banks of CIS major economies in their 
activity mostly use four groups of instruments of mon-
etary policy: required reserves, interest rate policy, 
monetary policy operations and liquidity regulation. 
Next, we analyze the features of the application of the 
above groups of instruments in correlation with the 
phases of business cycles. It should be noted that in 
exceptional cases quantitative restrictions are applied, 
however, we will not investigate them because they 
are not systematic nor utilize market based data tools. 
Some differences in the definition and application of 
instruments of monetary policy are observed in Bela-
rus. First, the tools of monetary policy are not deter-
mined by law. This reduces the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy, because society does not possess reliable 
information on the precise list of instruments for its 
implementation. Second, the National Bank does not 
allocate separate currency intervention as a monetary 
policy tool and does not provide information regarding 
their implementation on its official website. Third, 
there is no clear structuring of instruments that regulate 
liquidity and no publicly available data on the balance 
of the adjustments of liquidity. Consequently, when 
studying the impact of the National Bank of Belarus at 
the phase of economic cycle we are forced to limit the 
analysis of two groups of instruments: interest rate 
policy and required reserves. 
2.2. Interest rate policy. According to the regulations 
of the largest central banks of CIS countries, the inter-
est rate is one of the main channels of transmission 
mechanism, though the banks are aware of the limited 
capacity of its current application in a transitional re-
gime of monetary policy (National Bank of Ukraine, 
2004; Bank of Belarus, 2007; National Bank of 
Ukraine, 2009; National Bank of Kazakhstan, 2010; 
Stelmakh, 2009). In practice, the interest rate policies 
of central banks of major CIS countries are not effec-
tive enough. In most cases, there is no significant cor-
relation between central bank rates and interbank rates, 
which in turn, eliminates the impact of interest rate 
policy on the dynamics of retail rates money market 
segment. This thesis is confirmed by analysis of the 
interest rates in the banking systems of Russia, 
Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus for the period of 
2006-2010 (Appendix C). 
Inefficiency of interest rate policy of central banks 
of the largest CIS countries, as part of the business 
cycle monetary policy, is confirmed by the signifi-
cant spreads and dynamics between the rates of 
central banks on the one hand, and the interbank rate 
and the retail deposit market, on the other. Given the 
data presented in Table 2, we will determine wheth-
er a formally executed interest rate policy of central 
banks in major countries of the CIS had a counter-
cyclical function. 
Thus, only National Bank of Kazakhstan consistent-
ly applied countercyclical interest rate policy. Other 
central banks did not use this tool to influence the 
phase of the cycle, given the poor performance of 
the interest rate channel of transmission mechanism, 
or its effect was procyclical: the central banks tried 
to achieve the target performance goals (the dynam-
ics of money supply, inflation, etc.) that are not 
directly related to phases of economic cycle. 
Nevertheless, most CIS countries are in transition to 
the new monetary policy regime, which is based on 
ensuring price stability. Accordingly, it is expected 
to form the foundation that ensures effectiveness of 
the interest rate channel of transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in general (Somik, 2010). 
2.3. Required reserves. Another instrument of 
monetary policy that is applied by the central banks 
of major countries of the CIS is needed reserve re-
quirements. The influence of this tool is determined by 
the dynamics of its main parameters: reservation pe-
riod, the assets that may be counted as the reserves 
cover, the reserves object, required amount of reserves, 
which is kept daily in accounts of the central bank, 
required reserves ratios. After analyzing the above 
parameters, we can conclude that the first three pa-
rameters (period, coverage provisions and facility 
reservation) should be considered as elements of the 
mechanism of automatic reactions to the level of li-
quidity in the banking system. They can only indirect-
ly influence the use of required reserves as a tool for 
adjusting the phases of economic cycle. In this context, 
it is suggested to analyze the reserves ratio and propor-
tion to the requirements of required reserves that must 
constantly be kept in the accounts of the central bank. 
The dynamics of reserves established by the central 
banks of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan and Belarus, as well as, a share of required 
reserves that have to be kept in daily accounts of the 
regulator, are investigated. Therefore, during the 
peaks of the growth phase the central banks of ma-
jor CIS economies did not use reserves for counter-
cyclical influence on economic dynamics. On the 
other hand, all central banks (excluding National 
bank of Ukraine) are using this tool in the early 
phase of decline for countercyclical influence. 
2.4. Foreign exchange policy. The central banks of 
the major CIS economies implement foreign ex-
change policy and manage the international re-
serves, carrying out foreign exchange interventions 
(Table 3). The last action is affected by the sale of 
foreign currency to influence the domestic currency. 
A purchase or sale of foreign currency results in the 
increase or decrease in money supply on the domes-
tic money markets. 
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Appendix D presents the dynamics of foreign ex-
change interventions (with ‘+’ as a purchase, and 
with ‘-’ as the sale of foreign currency by central 
banks) and international reserves of the Russian Fed-
eration, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. As noted above, the 
laws of the Republic of Belarus and regulations of its 
National Bank monetary policy (including foreign 
exchange interventions) are not regarded as instru-
ments of monetary policy. 
Thus, foreign exchange interventions of the central 
banks of Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were not 
used to implement countercyclical monetary policy, 
and were used for other tasks: support for exchange 
rate stability and the formation of sufficient interna-
tional reserves. 
2.5. Regulation of liquidity. Figures 1-3 present the 
amount of funds granted to maintain the liquidity of 
banks with the sign “+” and with the sign “-” 
present specified amounts of funds mobilized from 
the commercial banks by the central banks. 
Fig. 1. Liquidity operations of the Central Bank of Russian 
Federation 
Fig. 2. Liquidity operations of the National Bank  
of Ukraine 
Fig. 3. Liquidity operations of the National Bank of  
Kazakhstan 
Source: Own calculations and [17-19]. 
Central banks use several tools to increase liquidity: 
overnight loans, short-term loans, stabilization loans, 
tenders of liquidity support, etc. Also, the tools of 
liquidity absorption of commercial banks are used: 
issuance and placement of securities by central banks, 
raising money in deposits, reverse repurchase trans-
actions, etc. Thus, the main indicators that illustrate 
the cumulative impact on liquidity of all instruments 
of central bank are operations with the balance of 
control liquidity. Belarus is excluded from the anal-
ysis due to the lack of data. 
Thus, the regulation of liquidity operations by central 
banks in the major CIS economies had mainly coun-
tercyclical orientation. However, their real motives 
were far from a theory of the cycle regulation of the 
economy. Dynamics of liquidity regulation primarily 
was held because of the need to smooth the current 
imbalance between supply and demand on the national 
money markets through the volume of currency 
bought or sold by central banks in national currency 
markets and the possibility of an excessive money 
supply pressure on price levels in the national economy. 
Conclusion 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 caused the 
recovery (growth) phase in most CIS countries to 
end. As a result, on the one hand the problem of the 
cycle regulation of economic processes became 
relevant; on the other hand there was an opportunity 
to fully study the parameters of business cycles of 
the CIS countries. The main results of the business 
cycles analysis in the CIS countries over the period 
from 1991 to 2010 are presented in the first part of 
this paper. Over the past 20 years the CIS countries 
experienced 14 completed cycles. As a result, as of 
2010, six economies were in the recovery phase, 
five economies were in the growth phase and one 
economy was in the decline phase. 
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More detailed analysis of business cycles in the 
major economies of the CIS: Russia, Ukraine, Ka-
zakhstan and Belarus, which collectively produce 
about 93% of the total GDP of the CIS was pre-
sented. Based on the evaluation of the peaks of the 
growth phase and boundaries of the decline phase 
the periods during which it made sense to apply the 
restrictive or expansionary monetary policy were 
defined.
In the second part, the paper analyzes the actual 
level of compliance regimes of monetary policies 
implemented by central banks in the major econo-
mies of the CIS at the peak phase and recovery 
phase. Given the differences in models of monetary 
policies, money market structure and channels of 
transmission mechanism of CIS in comparison with 
the developed countries, the assessing of the level of 
countercyclical monetary policy based on nominal 
interest rates and declining of the real interest rate 
from Taylor rule are not acceptable. To solve this 
problem we used an integrated approach, which 
provided retrospective analysis of the main instru-
ments of monetary policy: interest rates, required 
reserves, foreign exchange interventions to support 
liquidity. 
The analysis of dynamics of interest rates of the 
central banks of major countries of the CIS states 
that only the National Bank of Kazakhstan have 
consistently applied the interest rate as a part of 
countercyclical policy. Other central banks did not 
use this tool as an active element of monetary policy 
or applied as procyclical factor while focusing on 
goals that were not directly related to the regulation 
of the phase of economic cycle. 
Other tools of the monetary policy (required re-
serves, foreign exchange interventions to support 
liquidity) had largely a neutral effect on the parame-
ters of the economic cycle. The application was 
determined by the factors that lie in the plane of 
ensuring a stable exchange rate dynamics, control of 
inflation, adequate liquidity in the banking system, 
creation of reserves, etc. Certain exceptions are re-
quired reserves, which the majority of central banks 
(exclude National Bank of Ukraine) were using for 
cycle regulation. 
Given the above, it seems appropriate to use more 
active and effective countercyclical monetary policy 
by central banks in major economies of the CIS, 
which does not contradict the performance of their 
basic function, which is to ensure the stability of 
national currency. It should be emphasized that exter- 
nal (exchange rate) and internal (inflation) stability 
of national currency is in direct correlation with real 
GDP trend, and, therefore, with phases and parame-
ters of business cycles. Recently, the emphasis in 
the interpretation of the main function of the central 
banks of major countries of the CIS is shifting from 
maintaining stability of exchange rate to ensure an 
acceptable level of inflation (introduction of infla-
tion targeting). 
A complete task of forming a more active and effec-
tive countercyclical monetary policy is only possible 
when solving a number of objective problems in the 
regulation of economic processes. These problems 
lay within the competence of central banks and, as 
well as, the responsibility of other government au-
thorities. It is possible to highlight the following 
main problems that limit the elements of counter-
cyclical monetary policy in most CIS countries. 
First, deals with generation of inaccurate forecasts 
of macroeconomic dynamics. To effectively use the 
countercyclical monetary policy tools, central banks 
should have timely and reliable estimates of changes 
in the key macroeconomic parameters (especially 
GDP data), which define the phases of economic 
cycle. Development of quality macroeconomic mod-
els to predict the impact on the dynamics of monetary 
policy instruments of the macroeconomic key indica-
tors (GDP, inflation, exchange rate) should also be 
ensured.
Second, the monetary policy model should be re-
formed to improve efficiency of application of 
interest rates by central banks that influence the 
phase of economic cycle. It should be noted that 
during 2009-2010 some CIS countries took several 
measures to improve the efficiency of the interest 
rate channel of transmission mechanism. These 
measures and further formation of the necessary 
conditions for effective work in the long-term inter-
est rate channel will use interest rate policy as a 
basic element of countercyclical monetary policy. 
This approach is entirely consistent with interna-
tional experience. 
Third, there should be coordination of use of the other 
instruments of monetary policy (required reserves, 
foreign exchange intervention, liquidity support opera-
tions), which are mainly used for automatic control of 
the money market with the objectives of countercyc-
lical monetary policy. Solving these problems will 
help to build an effective countercyclical monetary 
policy, promote equilibrium of money market and 
support sustainable economic growth in CIS countries. 
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Appendix A 
Table 1. Business cycles characteristics of the CIS countries in 1991-2010 
Countries 
Length1 Amplitude2
Decline Recovery3 Growth Decline Recovery4 Growth
Main business cycles parameters
Azerbaijan 22 36 22 -58,12 164,45 113,63
Armenia
12 44 15 -53,09 125,08 56,8
5 4 -16,1 2,60 
Belarus
20 31 22 -34,86 59,91 60,57
2 2 3 -0,4 7,60 
Georgia
16 55 -72,33 144,01 
5 4 -5,37 6,30 
Kazakhstan 
20 6 -38,61 2,21 
4 20 18 -1,9 68,41 36,18
3 1 4 -2,4 7,00 
Kyrgyzstan 
20 34 -49,32 58,47 
3 18 -0,2 24,16 
3 -1,4
Moldova 
26 2 -62,89 1,60 
7 37 -9,69 67,35 
4 4 -6,5 6,90 
Russia 
26 2 -40,15 1,40 
4 36 3 -5,3 83,27 5,6
5 4 -7,9 4,00 
Tajikistan 26 54 -68,32 160,35 
Turkmenistan 
10 2 -18,88 1,50 
8 4 -23,25 6,70 
4 30 20 -11,4 68,72 56,24
Uzbekistan 22 22 36 -18,89 26,73 86,8
Ukraine
34 37 -59,21 81,76 
5 4 -17,2 4,20 
Characteristics of business cycles across all the countires of the CIS
Average (1) 12,2 19,7 15,9 -26,3 47,4 59,4
Standard deviation (2) 9,44 18,16 10,41 23,64 53,44 31,94
Coefficient of variation (2)/(1) 0,78 0,92 0,66 0,90 1,13 0,54
Number of observations 26 25 9 26 25 7
Characteristics of business cycles: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus
Average (1) 12,3 14,3 10,0 -20,8 32,0 34,1
Standard deviation (2) 11,02 14,35 8,27 19,74 34,37 33,84
Coefficient of variation (2)/(1) 0,90 1,00 0,83 0,95 1,07 0,99
Number of observations 10 10 5 10 10 3
Characteristics of highly synchronized declines caused by the financial crisis of 2008-2009 
Average (1) 4,1 3,3 3,5 -8,0 5,5 -
Standard deviation (2) 1,12 1,16 0,50 5,96 1,76 -
Coefficient of variation (2)/(1) 0,27 0,35 0,14 0,75 0,32 -
Number of observations 7 7 2 7 7 -
Notes: 1Number of quarters; 2Rate change of real GDP; 3Number of quarters untill reaching GDP level of 1990; 4Growth of real 
GDP untill 1990. 
Source: Own calculations.
A
pp
en
di
x 
B
 
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
  F
ig
. 1
. R
ea
l G
D
P 
dy
na
m
ic
s i
n 
R
us
si
a 
(1
99
1-
20
10
)  
 
 
 
 
 
Fi
g.
 2
. R
ea
l G
D
P 
dy
na
m
ic
s i
n 
U
kr
ai
ne
 (1
99
1-
20
10
)
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
Fi
g.
 3
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f r
ea
l G
D
P 
in
 K
az
ak
hs
ta
n 
(1
99
1-
20
10
)  
 
 
 
 
  F
ig
. 4
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f r
ea
l G
D
P 
in
 B
el
ar
us
 in
 (1
99
1-
20
10
) 
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 [1
5,
 2
0]
.
y 
= 
-0
,0
07
7x
2  +
 0
,8
05
9x
 +
 8
5,
00
9
R2
 =
 0
,6
47
4
85909510
0
10
5
11
0
11
5
1Q 91
3 Q 91
1Q 92
3 Q 92
1Q 93
3 Q 93
1Q 94
3 Q 94
1Q 95
3 Q 95
1Q 96
3 Q 96
1Q 97
3 Q 97
1Q 98
3 Q 98
1Q 99
3 Q 99
1Q 00
3 Q 00
1Q 01
3 Q 01
1Q 02
3 Q 02
1Q 03
3 Q 03
1Q 04
3 Q 04
1Q 05
3 Q 05
1Q 06
3 Q 06
1Q 07
3 Q 07
1Q 08
3 Q 08
1Q 09
3 Q 09
1Q 10
3 Q 10
%
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 o
f q
ua
te
rly
 G
D
P
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 o
f y
ea
rly
 G
D
P
tr
en
d 
of
 y
ea
rly
 G
D
P
y 
= 
-0
,0
10
7x
2  +
 1
,0
55
x 
+ 
78
,8
47
R
2  =
 0
,5
62
2
758085909510
0
10
5
11
0
11
5
1Q 91
3 Q 91
1Q 92
3 Q 92
1Q 93
3 Q 93
1Q 94
3 Q 94
1Q 95
3 Q 95
1Q 96
3 Q 96
1Q 97
3 Q 97
1Q 98
3 Q 98
1Q 99
3 Q 99
1Q 00
3 Q 00
1Q 01
3 Q 01
1Q 02
3 Q 02
1Q 03
3 Q 03
1Q 04
3 Q 04
1Q 05
3 Q 05
1Q 06
3 Q 06
1Q 07
3 Q 07
1Q 08
3 Q 08
1Q 09
3 Q 09
1Q 10
3 Q 10
%
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 o
f q
ua
te
rly
 G
D
P
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 o
f y
ea
rly
 G
D
P
tr
en
d 
of
 y
ea
rly
 G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
y 
= 
-0
,0
08
9x
2  +
 0
,9
32
7x
 +
 8
4,
16
5
R
2  =
 0
,7
84
4
85909510
0
10
5
11
0
11
5
1Q 91
3 Q 91
1Q 92
3 Q 92
1Q 93
3 Q 93
1Q 94
3 Q 94
1Q 95
3 Q 95
1Q 96
3 Q 96
1Q 97
3 Q 97
1Q 98
3 Q 98
1Q 99
3 Q 99
1Q 00
3 Q 00
1Q 01
3 Q 01
1Q 02
3 Q 02
1Q 03
3 Q 03
1Q 04
3 Q 04
1Q 05
3 Q 05
1Q 06
3 Q 06
1Q 07
3 Q 07
1Q 08
3 Q 08
1Q 09
3 Q 09
1Q 10
%
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 o
f q
ua
te
rly
 G
D
P
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 o
f y
ea
rly
 G
D
P
tr
en
d 
of
 y
ea
rly
 G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
y 
=
 -
0
,0
0
5
8
x2
 +
 0
,6
7
1
4
x 
+
 8
9
,0
6
2
R
2  
=
 0
,5
9
6
9
8
5
9
0
9
5
1
0
0
1
0
5
1
1
0
1
1
5
1Q 91
3 Q 91
1Q 92
3 Q 92
1Q 93
3 Q 93
1Q 94
3 Q 94
1Q 95
3 Q 95
1Q 96
3 Q 96
1Q 97
3 Q 97
1Q 98
3 Q 98
1Q 99
3 Q 99
1Q 00
3 Q 00
1Q 01
3 Q 01
1Q 02
3 Q 02
1Q 03
3 Q 03
1Q 04
3 Q 04
1Q 05
3 Q 05
1Q 06
3 Q 06
1Q 07
3 Q 07
1Q 08
3 Q 08
1Q 09
3 Q 09
1Q 10
3 Q 10
%
gr
ow
th
 r
at
e 
of
 q
ua
te
rl
y
 G
D
P
tr
en
d 
of
 y
ea
rl
y
 G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e
tr
en
d 
of
 y
ea
rl
y
 G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e
tre
nd
 o
f y
ea
rly
 G
D
P 
gr
ow
th
 ra
te
 
y 
= 
-0
,0
05
8x
2  +
 0
,6
71
4x
 +
 8
9,
06
2 
R
2 =
 0
,5
96
9 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 4, 2011
17
A
pp
en
di
x 
C
   
   
 F
ig
. 5
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f r
at
es
 o
f t
he
 b
an
ki
ng
 sy
st
em
 o
f R
us
si
a 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Fi
g.
 6
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f r
at
es
 o
f t
he
 b
an
ki
ng
 sy
st
em
 o
f U
kr
ai
ne
  
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 F
ig
. 7
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f r
at
es
 o
f t
he
 b
an
ki
ng
 sy
st
em
 o
f K
az
ak
hs
ta
n 
 
 
 
 
Fi
g.
 8
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f r
at
es
 o
f t
he
 b
an
ki
ng
 sy
st
em
 o
f B
el
ar
us
   
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 [1
6-
19
].
024681012141618
01.01.06
01.03.06
01.05.06
01.07.06
01.09.06
01.11.06
01.01.07
01.03.07
01.05.07
01.07.07
01.09.07
01.11.07
01.01.08
01.03.08
01.05.08
01.07.08
01.09.08
01.11.08
01.01.09
01.03.09
01.05.09
01.07.09
01.09.09
01.11.09
01.01.10
01.03.10
01.05.10
01.07.10
01.09.10
01.11.10
%
R
af
in
an
ci
ng
 ra
te
 o
f B
an
k 
of
 R
us
si
a
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 in
te
rb
an
k 
ra
te
 o
n 
on
e-
da
y 
in
te
rb
an
k 
lo
an
s 
in
 ru
bl
es
 
D
ep
os
it 
ra
te
 e
xe
ce
pt
 o
n-
de
m
an
d 
de
po
si
ts
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
of
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
ep
os
it 
ra
te
05101520253035404550
01.01.06
01.03.06
01.05.06
01.07.06
01.09.06
01.11.06
01.01.07
01.03.07
01.05.07
01.07.07
01.09.07
01.11.07
01.01.08
01.03.08
01.05.08
01.07.08
01.09.08
01.11.08
01.01.09
01.03.09
01.05.09
01.07.09
01.09.09
01.11.09
01.01.10
01.03.10
01.05.10
01.07.10
01.09.10
%
M
ai
n 
ra
te
 o
f N
at
io
na
l B
an
k 
of
 U
kr
ai
ne
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
re
fin
an
ci
ng
 ra
te
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
 in
te
rb
an
k 
cr
ed
it 
ra
te
 in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
de
po
si
t r
at
e 
in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y
024681012
01.01.06
01.03.06
01.05.06
01.07.06
01.09.06
01.11.06
01.01.07
01.03.07
01.05.07
01.07.07
01.09.07
01.11.07
01.01.08
01.03.08
01.05.08
01.07.08
01.09.08
01.11.08
01.01.09
01.03.09
01.05.09
01.07.09
01.09.09
01.11.09
01.01.10
01.03.10
01.05.10
01.07.10
01.09.10
01.11.10
%
R
af
in
an
ci
ng
 ra
te
 o
f N
at
io
na
l B
an
k 
of
 K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
 in
te
rb
an
k 
cr
ed
it 
ra
te
 in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
co
ns
um
er
 d
ep
os
it 
ra
te
 in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y
W
ei
gh
te
d 
av
er
ag
e 
co
rp
or
at
e 
de
po
si
t r
at
e 
in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y
4681012141618202224
01.01.06
01.03.06
01.05.06
01.07.06
01.09.06
01.11.06
01.01.07
01.03.07
01.05.07
01.07.07
01.09.07
01.11.07
01.01.08
01.03.08
01.05.08
01.07.08
01.09.08
01.11.08
01.01.09
01.03.09
01.05.09
01.07.09
01.09.09
01.11.09
01.01.10
01.03.10
01.05.10
01.07.10
01.09.10
01.11.10
%
R
af
in
an
ci
ng
 ra
te
 o
f N
at
io
na
l B
an
k 
of
 B
el
ar
us
A
ve
ra
ge
 o
ne
 d
ay
 in
te
rb
an
k 
ra
te
 in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y 
A
ve
ra
ge
 c
on
su
m
er
 d
ep
os
it 
ra
te
 in
 n
at
io
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y
O
ve
rn
ig
ht
 c
re
di
t r
at
e 
of
 N
at
io
na
l B
an
k 
of
 B
el
ar
us
18
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 4, 2011
-8
00
0
-6
00
0
-4
00
0
-2
00
00
20
00
40
00
60
00
1Q 2006
2Q 2006
3Q 2006
4Q 2006
1Q 2007
2Q 2007
3Q 2007
4Q 2007
1Q 2008
2Q 2008
3Q 2008
4Q 2008
1Q 2009
2Q 2009
3Q 2009
4Q 2009
1Q 2010
2Q 2010
3Q 2010
in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
–4 
00
0
8 
00
0
12
 0
00
16
 0
00
20
 0
00
24
 0
00
28
 0
00
re
se
rv
es
Fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 (q
ua
te
rly
 b
al
an
ce
) i
n 
m
ln
 U
S 
do
lla
rs
 (l
ef
t a
xi
s)
G
ro
ss
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
es
er
ve
s 
of
 K
az
ak
hs
ta
n 
in
 m
ln
 U
S 
do
lla
rs
 (r
ig
ht
 a
xi
s)
A
pp
en
di
x 
D
Fi
g.
 9
. D
yn
am
ic
s o
f c
ur
re
nc
y 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n,
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
es
er
ve
s o
f t
he
 C
en
tr
al
 B
an
k 
of
 R
us
si
an
 F
ed
er
at
io
n 
   
   
   
   
 F
ig
. 1
0.
 D
yn
am
ic
s o
f i
nt
er
ve
nt
io
ns
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
es
er
ve
s o
f t
he
 N
B
U
 
 
  F
ig
. 1
1.
 D
yn
am
ic
s o
f i
nt
er
ve
nt
io
ns
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
es
er
ve
s o
f t
he
 N
B
K
So
ur
ce
: O
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 [1
7-
20
].
-1
30
00
0
-1
10
00
0
-9
00
00
-7
00
00
-5
00
00
-3
00
00
-1
00
00
10
00
0
30
00
0
50
00
0
70
00
0
1Q 2006
2Q 2006
3Q 2006
4Q 2006
1Q 2007
2Q 2007
3Q 2007
4Q 2007
1Q 2008
2Q 2008
3Q 2008
4Q 2008
1Q 2009
2Q 2009
3Q 2009
4Q 2009
1Q 2010
2Q 2010
3Q 2010
4Q 2010
in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
10
0 
00
0
15
0 
00
0
20
0 
00
0
25
0 
00
0
30
0 
00
0
35
0 
00
0
40
0 
00
0
45
0 
00
0
50
0 
00
0
55
0 
00
0
60
0 
00
0
re
se
rv
es
 
N
et
 U
S 
do
lla
rs
 b
ou
gh
t q
ua
te
rly
 b
y 
Ba
nk
 o
f R
us
si
a 
(le
ft 
ax
is
)
N
et
 E
ur
os
 b
ou
gh
t q
ua
te
rly
 b
y 
Ba
nk
 o
f R
us
si
a 
(le
ft 
ax
is
)
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
es
er
ve
s 
in
 m
ln
 U
S 
do
lla
rs
 (r
ig
ht
 a
xis
)
-1
10
00
-9
00
0
-7
00
0
-5
00
0
-3
00
0
-1
00
0
10
00
30
00
50
00
1Q 2006
2Q 2006
3Q 2006
4Q 2006
1Q 2007
2Q 2007
3Q 2007
4Q 2007
1Q 2008
2Q 2008
3Q 2008
4Q 2008
1Q 2009
2Q 2009
3Q 2009
4Q 2009
1Q 2010
2Q 2010
3Q 2010
in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
–4 
00
0
8 
00
0
12
 0
00
16
 0
00
20
 0
00
24
 0
00
28
 0
00
32
 0
00
36
 0
00
40
 0
00
re
se
rv
es
Fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
 o
f B
an
k 
of
 U
kr
ai
ne
 (q
ua
te
rly
 b
al
an
ce
) i
n 
m
ln
U
S 
do
lla
rs
 (l
ef
t a
xis
)
Go
ld
 a
nd
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
re
se
rv
es
 o
f U
kr
ai
ne
 in
 m
ln
 U
S 
do
lla
rs
 (r
ig
ht
 a
xis
)
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 8, Issue 4, 2011
19
